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Abstract. An extensive empirical literature indicates that, even without formal intel-
lectual property rights, innovators enjoy a variety of rst-mover advantages and that
`imitation' is itself a costly activity. There is also accumulating evidence that an `open'
approach to knowledge production can deliver substantial eciency advantages. This
paper introduces a formal framework incorporating all of these factors. We examine the
relative performance of an `open' versus a `closed' (proprietary) regime, and explicitly
characterise the circumstances in which an open approach, despite its eect on facilitat-
ing imitation, results in a higher level of innovation.
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1. Introduction
The last decade or so have seen an explosion in the level of `open'
1 information pro-
duction not only in traditional areas such as software (e.g. Linux, Firefox) but also in
areas ranging from online encyclopaedias (Wikipedia) to genomic databases (the Human
Genome Project). Such developments suggest that, at least in some important cases, open
models of knowledge production can do as, or even better, than closed
2 ones. As we discuss
Faculty of Economics and Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge. Email: rp240@cam.ac.uk or
rufus@rufuspollock.org. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (unported) v3.0. I thank
Rupert Gatti and David Newbery for valuable input on early versions of these ideas. I also wish to thank
participants at the 2008 FLOSS 2.0 workshop for their comments and suggestions.
1For the purposes of this paper a work is `open' or `open-source' if it can be used, redistributed and
reused freely. Here, freely means without monetary or other substantial restriction though, for example
the requirement of attribution or even that derivative works be re-shared, does not render a work unfree.
However it does exclude the requirement of payment or that explicit permission be sought, or the imposition
of restrictions on the type of use (such as limiting it to research or non-commercial activities). Furthermore,
since, without access, a piece of knowledge cannot be used it also excludes the use of secrecy { `open'
knowledge must be publicly available.
2That is those based on on secrecy, exclusive rights (IP) or some combination thereof.
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further below, this is somewhat surprising and it is important to investigate carefully how
and why this could be the case.
It is important to note here that we are focused on the rate of innovation and not the
level of welfare. After all it is well-accepted that being more `open' (having weaker intel-
lectual property rights) can improve welfare by improving access. But this is certainly not
the case in relation to innovation. In fact most of the traditional literature on innovation
would support, implicitly or explicitly, reasoning along the following lines: the level of
innovation is a function of the value that innovators (that is the original creators of a
work or invention) obtain, V , and the cost they incur, F. Furthermore, it is clear that the
level (or likelihood) of innovation is increasing in the value and decreasing in cost. Label
the closed and open regimes by C and O respectively then it is usual to assume that the
proprietary regime results in higher returns than in the open one { V P > V O { while
costs are unchanged { FP = FO. This necessarily implies that innovation must be higher
in the proprietary regime than in the open one. Furthermore, suppose imitation has cost
FIMM but is `fast'.3 Then, simple competitive free entry arguments would suggest that
the common returns (common because imitation is fast) must be driven down to costs so
the innovator receives V = FIMM. Since an innovator must cover her costs innovation
can only occur if imitation is at least as costly as innovation: FIMM  F. But, at least in
the open case, imitation is certain to be cheaper than innovation and hence no innovation
will occur!
This brief sketch of the standard approach already indicates why the level of `open'
production is rather surprising. It also points us to where we must look if we are to
explain the success, or simply survival, of open approaches: either we can examine costs
(F) or income/value V . At this point it is worth recalling that repeated surveys, such as
Levin et al. (1987), Manseld (1985), Cohen et al. (2000), and Arundel (2001), show that
rms appropriate returns from innovation using a variety of methods other than exclusive
rights (IP) such as secrecy, lead time, marketing and sales, learning curve advantages. Not
3It is noteworthy that much of the existing theoretical literature has tended to assume `perfect' nonrivalry,
that is, that an innovation (or creative work) once made may be costlessly, and instantaneously, reproduced
if not protected by IP or hidden from others via secrecy. For example, Nordhaus (1969) (and following him
Scherer (1972)), in what is considered to be one of the founding papers of the policy literature, implicitly
assume that without a patent an innovator gains no remuneration. Similarly, Klemperer (1990) in his
paper on patent breadth makes clear his assumption of costless imitation as do Scotchmer and Green
(1990). For a more recent example see e.g. Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001).INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 3
only does this indicate that there are a variety of rst-mover advantage for an innovator,
but this work also shows that imitation is a costly process both in terms of time and money
even when no exclusive rights are used (or available). Of course, the major alternative
to IP is often secrecy. In the case of `open' (`open source') knowledge production both
secrecy and the traditional exclusivity of IP are foregone. Nevertheless, even in this case,
it is likely that still exist some degree of imitation costs and rst-mover advantage for the
innovator.
This paper takes this empirical evidence `seriously' and we explicitly model imitation
as costly (though though still usually as cheaper than innovation) and the innovator as
having some form of rst-mover advantage. Our framework provides a simple, and novel,
way to conceptualize `innovation' space, which allows one to compare innovation under
a proprietary and an `open-source' regime in a straightforward and intuitive manner.
We show that, even in the baseline case where `open-sourcing' simply reduces imitation
(copying) costs, some innovation will still take place under the open-source regime { albeit
substantially less than in the proprietary case. The crucial point here is that at low
innovation costs `allowable' imitation costs (that is imitation costs that still result in
innovation being made) can be very low and thus even for large reductions in the cost of
imitations some innovations remain feasible.
Our next step is to consider the possibility that an `open' approach reduces both innova-
tion and imitation costs. A variety of authors (e.g. Lakhani and von Hippel (2003); Bessen
(2006)) have pointed out that an `open-source' approach may oer substantial eciency
advantages { for example by allowing users to participate directly in adding features and
xing `bugs' { and this is particularly true where the information good is complex and
(hence) transaction costs are high. While the initial arguments in favour of the eciency of
open approaches were based on anecdotes or case study recent empirical work on a larger
scale, such as Koch (2008), have provided strong empirical support for his view. Thus,
we explicitly model the move to `open-source' as resulting in a simultaneous reduction in
both innovation and imitation cost. This clearly makes an open approach more attractive
compared to the baseline case. However, the crucial question is: to what extent { after
all the situation may well still be (far) inferior to that under a closed approach. Here, we
are able to situate the eect of a change of regime within a single overarching, but simple,4 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
framework. Using it, we can compare, clearly, and formally, dierent assumptions about
what going `open' entails, and derive specic (sucient) conditions under which a move
to an open regime results in an increase in innovation.
2. The Model
There is some information good, the `innovation',4 which can be created at xed cost Fi
{ the innovation cost. Once created, it may be imitated with cost Fm (implicitly assumed
to be common across all imitators).5
What does this imitation cost, Fm, represent? The empirical literature discussed above
suggests two main options: either it represents the cost of imitation in money or the cost
in time.6 In general we need not be too concerned with whether it is one of these, or the
other { or some combination of both. Rather what will matter for our purposes is that
the imitation `cost' a) aects the income of the innovator b) is itself aected by the regime
(open or proprietary) under which the information good is produced.
Specically, dene  to be gross prots of the innovator (that is revenues net of all
expenses other than the main innovation cost). Then revenues are a function of imita-
tion cost:  = (Fm), furthermore as imitation costs rise innovator's prots are non-
decreasing: 0  0. Finally, though infrequently used in what follows, it will be useful to
dene m(Fm) as the prot of the imitators.7
In what follows, we will rarely go beyond this reduced form approach to specify the
exact mechanism by which imitation costs impact on the innovator's income as this al-
lows us to proceed with greater generality. For our purposes, all we will require is that
costs and prots are all denominated in comparable terms { for example, in terms of a
numeraire good `money'. Nevertheless, it may be useful for the reader to have in mind
some concrete examples of the underlying strategic interactions by which an innovator's
prots are determined.
4Throughout we will use the term innovation and imitation rather than alternatives such as creator and
copier. Though the former are usually more associated with (patentable) `ideas' while the second are more
associated with (copyrightable) expressions no such distinction is intended here.
5This model can easily be generalized to allow variations in imitation costs { for example imitation costs
could fall as more and more imitators enter, or it could fall with time etc.
6There are clearly other possibilities, for example imitation may be limited by the availability of skilled
labour, or access to other necessary complementary assets { see e.g. Teece (1986). However, these are both
more complex to model and, we believe, of lesser importance than the main factors of time and money.
7If prots vary across imitators dene this as the maximum of the prots earned by imitators.INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 5
One possibility is that Fm represents pure monetary cost and the innovator and imitators
compete to supply a homogenous good in Stackelberg fashion (the innovator being the rst-
mover).8 In that case, since imitators must cover their own xed cost, Fm denes, via a
zero prot free-entry condition, the total number of imitators who enter and hence the
price level. Lower imitation costs lead to more entry and hence lower prices.
Another possibility is that Fm represents time, that is, the delay before imitators are
able to produce a competing product. In this case the innovator enjoys a monopoly prior
to imitator entry followed by some subsequent competitive game. Again it is clear that a
lower imitation `cost' corresponds to lower prots for an innovator. Yet another possibility
is to have competition between innovators and imitators but with dierentiated products
(whether vertically or horizontally dierentiated). Here, Fm would be some measure of
the proximity of imitators to the innovator in product space and as Fm rises innovator's
enjoy a larger/stronger local monopoly and hence once again have larger (gross) prots.
2.1. A Normalization. Let M be monopoly prots for the innovator (i.e. without any
imitative entry). No agent's prots can be greater than monopoly prots M. Hence, it








We can also take (normalized) prots  to be a function of fm rather than Fm. It is




2.2. The Space of Innovations. In this model an innovation (under a particular regime
{ see next section) is specied by the tuple consisting of its `innovation' cost and its
`imitation' cost: (fi;fm). This conveniently allows us to visualize innovation space in a
two dimensional graph (see the gures below for examples). Specically, innovation and
imitation costs are non-negative, fi;fm > 0 and under our normalizations must lie between
8Pollock (2006) considers this particular model in detail.6 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
0 and 1. Thus, under the assumptions given and using normalized variables the space of
innovations is IS = f(fi;fm) 2 [0;1]  [0;1]g, that is the unit square.
In addition, we note that if imitation cost is less or equal to innovation cost, as is often
assumed, we have: fm  fi. In this case no innovation will ever lie above the `diagonal' in
the unit square and IS = f(fi;fm) 2 [0;1][0;1] : fm  fig. Under the intuitive equation
of area with amount, using (fi;fm) coordinates gives the impression that the number of
(potential) innovations is dropping as innovation cost drops (since the height under the
diagonal is falling with innovation costs). This is rather misleading and to correct this it is
natural to change to (fi;) coordinates in which case innovation space is again the full unit
square: IS = f(fi;) 2 [0;1]  [0;1]g. Obviously there is a one-to-one mapping between
these coordinate systems and so it does not strictly matter which we use. However, in
what follows it will frequently be more convenient to work with (fi;) rather than (fi;fm).
2.3. Proprietary and Open Regimes. We shall be interested in comparing dierent
regimes under which a given innovation (or set of innovations) is produced. A regime
(R) can have two distinct eects. First, it can aects the innovation and imitation costs
(fi;fm), that is, the location of an innovation in `innovation space' (IS). In particular, lo-
cation of an innovation (or set of innovations) can be represented by some density function
on IS, say g which is a function of the regime { so g = gR.9 Second, the regime may alter
the prot function itself , that is, the manner in which imitation cost aects the (gross)
prots of the innovators.
Here, we focus on the rst of these eects only and assume that the regime has no impact
on the prot function itself { of course, it will aect prots since these are a function of
imitation costs. We will be interested in comparing and contrasting two particular regimes:
a closed/proprietary one { based on some combination of secrecy and exclusive rights (e.g.
patent or copyright) { and an open one. These two regimes, via their impact on imitation
and innovation cost will lead to the same innovation (or set of innovations) being located
in dierent positions in innovation space. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case where
the move from closed to open results in a drop in both innovation costs fi and a reduction
9This distributional approach gives us a natural way to represent not only a single innovation or technology
but a whole set of innovations { for example at the industry or economy wide level { as well to represent
uncertainty with respect to the location of a particular innovation or technology.INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 7
Figure 1. Eect of dierent regimes on the location of an innovation or
innovation set. As shown, an open regime results in both lower innovation
and lower imitation costs (both absolutely, fm, and proportionately ).
in proportional imitation costs  (which corresponds to an even larger drop in imitation
costs since fm = fi).
3. Analysis
Our analysis proceeds in stages. First, we dene the feasible set, that is the subset of
innovations in innovation space that would occur with a particular prot function. Next,
we deduce some basic properties and structure of this feasible set. Given a particular set of
(potential) innovations a regime determines their location in innovation space. Intersecting
that location with the feasible set we have the set of innovations that occur under that
particular regime. Since, as just discussed above, the prot function does not itself change
across regimes the feasible set remains constant. Thus, nally, we look out how a change
in regime aects the level of innovation by examining how the regime alters the location
of (potential) innovations within innovation space, and thereby alters the intersection of
these innovations with the feasible set. In particular, we can provide non-trivial conditions
on the size of the reductions in innovation and imitation cost under which a move to an
open regime increases the level of innovation.8 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
3.1. The Feasible Set. Take a particular regime R. This has associated with it some
(gross) prots function: (fm). A (potential) innovation, (fi;fm), is feasible if, and only
if, it generates a non-negative net surplus for its associated innovator: (fm)   fi  0 {
that is if, and only if, its xed cost is less than its (gross) prots. We may then dene the
`feasible set' as the subset of IS consisting of all (potential) innovations which are feasible:
Denition 1 (The Feasible Set). The `Feasible Set', F (or FR, for a regime R is the
subset of innovation space whose corresponding innovations occur under R:
F = Feasible Set = f(fi;fm) 2 IS : fi  (fm)g = f(fi;) 2 IS : fi  (fi)g
What can we say about the structure of the feasible set? First, observe that the feasible
set is closed and hence it includes its boundary  F = @F. Next note that, with innovation
cost on the x-axis in the IS diagram, the feasible set will simply be the space lying to the
left of the line fi = (fm). Since fi is plotted on the x-axis it is natural to transform
this to a function of innovation cost: F is then the set lying above the line g(fi) where
g =  1. In terms of proportional imitation cost coordinates (fi;) this is the line given
by h(fi) where h = g(fi)=fi, and the feasible set are those points lying above this line.10
Thus, what is needed is to characterise how gross prots, (fm), vary with imitation
costs. First recall that we have 0 > 0 that is gross prots are increasing in imitation
cost. Next, observe that as we are using renormalized variables limfm! (fm) = 1 and
so (fi;1) 2 F8fi 2 (0;1) (in particular, (1;1) is in F). Similarly, the limit of prots as
imitation costs go to zero must be non-negative: (0)  0. Figure 2 shows a graphical
rendering of one possible feasible set conforming to these restrictions together with a
labelling of the main features (e.g. g;h curves). To go beyond these basic observations we
need to introduce a condition on the prot function. First a denition:
Denition 2. A function H(x) is super-linear (sub-linear) if H(kx)  kH(x) (H(kx) 
kH(x)) 8k 2 (0;1). That is H lies below (above) any ray from the origin to x.
Note that a sucient condition for H to be super-linear (sub-linear) is that (a) H(0)
is non-negative (b) H is quasi-concave (quasi-convex) (Pf: take 0;x as the endpoints of
10Note that while g was increasing { as innovations cost rise so the feasible imitation cost must rise { h
may not be.INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 9




i ;h(fi) = fi. The functions shown conform to the restrictions
described in the text (in fact they derive from the Stackelberg example
already discussed in the section 2).
an interval and apply the usual denition of convexity/concavity). With this denition in
place we may make our main assumption regarding the prot function (fm):
Assumption 3. The prot function is super-linear in imitation cost fm.
This has several important implications. However, before discussing these we should
ask whether this assumption is reasonable. Our answer is a clear yes. For example, in
the Stackelberg case discussed above, and analyzed at length in Pollock (2006), prots are
concave in imitation costs: (fm) =
p
fm (remember here that all values are normalized
to lie in 0;1 so
p
fm  fm). Taking another of the examples mentioned previously, if
fm measures time before imitative entry then simple discounting again implies that  is
concave and hence that  is super-linear. To take another example, suppose fm represent
the mark-up over (variable) costs the innovator is able to charge,11 then for all `normal'
models of demand one again has that  is (quasi-) concave in fm. Lastly, suppose the
innovator has some xed rst mover advantage A over imitators so  = m + A. With
a standard free-entry assumption imitator prots m will be driven down close to fm.
Then (fm)  fm + A and so  is super-linear in fm.12 To summarize, in any situation
where prots are concave in imitation `costs'  will be super-linear. In most normal cases
(e.g. several of those just discussed) concavity follows from classic diminishing returns
11This would be a natural outcome of a model where imitators locate in relation to an innovator in quality
`space' and fm is some measure of their `proximity' to the innovator { cf. `breadth' in standard patent
models.
12For k 2 (0;1) we have (kfm)  kfm + A  k(fm + A) = k(fm.10 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
arguments and hence  is super-linear. We therefore feel this is a natural, and reasonable,
assumption to impose. We now return to the implications of this assumption for the
structure of the feasible set.
First, take any point in the feasible set (fi;fm) and k 2 (0;1). Now, by super-linearity,
(fm)  fi hence (kfm)  k(fm)  kfi and hence the point (kfi;kfm) is in the feasible
set. In particular, for any point on the boundary of the feasible set (i.e. ((fm);fm) or,
equivalently, (fi;g(fi)) the entire ray from that point to the origin must be in the feasible
set. This immediately implies that g(fi), the function dening the boundary of the feasible
set in terms of innovation cost, is sub-linear. Changing to fi; coordinates this equates
to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If an innovation (fi;) is in the feasible set then all points on the hori-
zontal line to its left lie within the feasible set. Equivalently, h, which denes the boundary
of the feasible set, is non-decreasing in innovation cost.
Proof. Take a point on the boundary of the feasible set: (f0




i )  f0
i . Consider a horizontal line from this point to the  axis, i.e. points
of the form (fk
i ;); = 0;fk
i = kf0















By super-linearity of , (kf0
m)  k(f0
m) which we have already shown is  kfi = fk
i .
Hence (fk
m;) is in the feasible set. Thus, the entire horizontal line is in the feasible
set. This in turn implies that h is non-decreasing (if not we would have a point on the
boundary of feasible set with not all of the associated horizontal line within the feasible
set { contradiction). 
The implications of this result, together with the previous remarks, may be summarized
in the following proposition:INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 11
Proposition 5. Take an innovation X = (fi;fm) = (fi;) and another innovation Y =
(f0
i;f0
m). For some ; we may write f0
i = fi;f0
m = fm and, without loss of generality,
 < 1. If X is in the feasible set, a sucient (though not necessary) condition for Y
to be feasible is   , that is, the drop in imitation cost is proportionally at least as
great as the drop in innovation cost. In addition, if X is not in F and    then for
 suciently small (and hence  suciently small) Y is feasible { that is if we reduce
innovation cost and imitation costs at a proportional rate then for a suciently great
reduction the innovation becomes feasible.
Proof. X is feasible so (fm)  fi. Now, (f0
m) = (fm) = (fm)  fi. If    then
fi  fi = f0
i and we are done. Note that a more intuitive, geometrical version, of this
proof is provided using the IS diagram in the next section (see Figure 3). 
3.2. Changing Regimes. We now consider the eect of a change of regime on whether
an innovation is feasible { or more generally, for a given set of innovations what subset of
them are feasible. In particular, we examine what happens if an open regime is adopted
instead of a closed, proprietary, one. As discussed in Section 2.3, the change in regime is
naturally modelled as a change in the innovation and imitation costs associated with an
innovation. Thus, take a particular innovation or technology X, and dene XC = (fC
i ;fC
m)
to be its location in innovation space under a closed regime and XO = (fO
i ;fO
m) its location








O = C =)  =


;, measure the relative drop in innovation and imitation costs (respectively) when
moving from a closed to an open regime while  is the ratio of these (relative) changes in
imitation cost to innovation cost. A large  correspond to a situation where innovation
costs have fallen much more (relatively) than imitation costs, a small  corresponds to the
reverse, that is innovation costs have dropped (relatively) much less than imitation costs,
and  = 1 corresponds to the case where both costs have fallen relatively by the same12 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
amount. Clearly we have ;  0 as innovation and imitation costs cannot be negative.
In addition we have:
Assumption 6. Under a move to an open regime imitation and innovation costs either
fall or remain unchanged, that is ;  1.
This has been stated as an `assumption' however this statement appears to us so self-
evident from the denition of openness as to hardly merit justication. Certainly, it seems
clear that by making one's work open one can only be reducing the costs of `imitation'
(after all reproduction and reuse are now expressly permitted), while it seems hard to
think of any circumstance in which innovation costs increase (they may stay the same {
more on this below).
Given this `assumption', we always have ; 2 [0;1] (and hence  2 [0;1]) irrespective
of the type of the innovation and its initial location under the closed regime. This provides
one of the main reasons for using relative values rather than absolute ones (e.g. fi =
fC
i  fO
i ), for, with them, we would have that the change in a variable such as innovation
cost was limited by its initial value (e.g. fi  0 ) fi  fC
i ). Furthermore, relative
values t naturally with the previous results on the structure of the feasible set. We turn
now, to the main question of this section. It should already be clear that the impact of a
move to openness on feasibility will depend on how innovation and imitation costs change,
that is on the values of ;. We shall consider several distinct cases in turn.
3.2.1. The `Traditional' View. The `traditional' theoretical view discussed in the intro-
duction equates to:
Relative Change in Innovation Cost =  = 1
Relative Change in Imitation Cost =  << 1
That is, a move to openness, by depriving an innovator of the use of exclusive rights or
secrecy,13 must necessarily reduce imitation costs { and reduce them signicantly (hence
 << 1 not simply  < 1). Furthermore, though usually more implicit, it is also assumed
13In fact secrecy is usually ignored and it is simply the lack of exclusive rights that is considered sucient
to justify this result.INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 13
that innovation costs are unaected by a change a regime { that is, openness has no impact
on the innovator's cost of producing the initial innovation.
The implications of such assumptions are clear. Reducing imitation costs reduces an
innovator's prots while costs are unchanged. Thus, an innovation that is feasible under
the closed regime may become infeasible under the open one (while any innovation that
is initially infeasible remains so).14 Hence, moving to an open regime makes it less likely
a given innovation is feasible and, thus, on average, reduces the level of innovation that
occurs. Furthermore, with the drop in imitation costs being large ( << 1) it is very likely
that an innovation feasible under the closed regime is infeasible under the open one.15
3.2.2. Changes in Innovation Cost. As discussed in the introduction there is accumulating
evidence that an open regime can reduce the innovators cost either by simply making
production more ecient or by allowing the innovator to share some of the costs with the
wider user community. Let us therefore consider the more general case where a move to
openness reduces innovation costs in addition to imitation costs:
Relative Change in Innovation Cost =  < 1
Relative Change in Imitation Cost =  < 1
Here it will be useful to work primarily with ; =

 rather than ; { that is in (fi;)
coordinates rather than (fi;fm) coordinates.
Proposition 7. Irrespective both of the initial location of the innovation in IS and , if
  1 (  ) then an open regime is `better' than a closed one. `Better', here, meaning
that the level of innovation under that regime is greater than or equal to that under the
alternative.
Proof. Proposition 5 shows that, irrespective of the initial costs and , if   1 any feasible
innovation remains feasible. Furthermore, it also shows that, at least for some values of
14In IS space we can visualize this change as move vertically downwards (note this trajectory is the same
whether in (fi;fm) or (fi;) coordinates). Since the feasible set lies above the line dened by a non-
decreasing function g (or h) a move vertically downwards can only make it more likely a given point is not
in the feasible set.
15Alternatively, suppose the drop in imitation costs is not large but (as is often also implicitly assumed)
rst-mover advantages are small then prots, (fm), are close to imitation costs. Assuming that a given
innovation is initially feasible we must have that its cost is close to (initial) imitation costs (fi 2 [fm;(fm])
and hence any reduction in prots is likely to make it infeasible.14 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
 (and/or the initial location of the innovation), a innovation infeasible under a closed
regime becomes feasible under an open one. 
This is the most general statement we can make without further information about the
form of the feasible set (i.e. the structure of the underlying competition model) and/or
details of the location of the innovation within that space. Nevertheless, it is important to
realize that an open regime may be `better' under much weaker conditions than   1. For
example, in the Stackelberg case discussed above (fm) =
p
fm and hence the boundary
of the feasible set has the particularly simple form: h(fi) = fi;(g(fi) = f2
i ). Thus, in
this case an open regime is better if   . So, for example, if innovation costs drop
signicantly under the move to an open regime,   1, then the open regime will be
better for all but very small  (to be precise it will be better if imitation costs have fallen
by less than  = 2   since   1). To illustrate this point suppose, under the closed
regime, that innovation costs were $1 million imitation costs $750k and that the innovation
was feasible). Furthermore, suppose an open approach reduced innovation costs to $200k,
a fth of their original value, then imitation costs could have gone down to any amount
above $30k (one 25th of their original value) and the innovation would still be feasible.
In addition to this `algebraic' proof, it is useful to consider an alternative equivalent
geometrical approach based on IS diagrams as this easier to understand and provides a
more intuitive understanding of the results. In IS space using (fi;) coordinates a change
in costs given by (;);  1, equates to a translation of a point in the following ways,
each of which is illustrated on the IS diagrams in Figure 3:
 (;) = (1;< 1): vertically downwards. This is the `traditional case': innovation
costs are unchanged and imitation costs ( =  with xed innovation costs) have
dropped.
 (;) = (;1): horizontally left. Innovation and imitation costs have dropped by
equal proportions.
 (;) = (;> 1): diagonally to the left and upwards. A reduction in innovation
costs with a less than proportional drop in imitation costs. One (extreme) examples
is the case of a reduction in innovation costs with no drop in imitation costs which
corresponds to (; 1
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Figure 3. Examples of dierent `trajectories' in innovation space under a
change from a closed to an open regime. Cases are numbered to correspond
to those enumerated in text. Two dierent feasible sets are illustrated.
The rst illustrates perhaps the simplest prot function satisfying super-
linearity viz (fm) = kfm (here k = 2). The second is that arising from
the Stackelberg model.16 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 2008
 (;) = (;< 1): diagonally to the left and downwards. A reduction in innovation
costs with a more than proportional drop in imitation costs.
As just mentioned, Figure 3 illustrates these trajectories together with two examples of
feasible sets both satisfying the (minimal) `horizontal-line' condition. Not only is the basic
result clear but we can easily deduce various other simple properties. For example, (for
most feasible sets and most innovations) as  ! 0 (imitation costs fall much more than
innovation costs) a closed regime is `better' than an open one (the `traditional' result).
Similarly, one can easily see how conditions on ; will vary with the form of the feasible
set (as given by its boundary function h) as well as with (initial) location of an innovation
relative to that boundary.
To conclude, if we allow, as the evidence suggests, that openness results in a fall in
innovation costs as well as imitation costs then an open regime may be superior to a
closed one (for innovation). Whether this is so, depends on the relative rates at which
costs of innovation have fallen relative to imitation costs. It was shown that, at a minimum,
with equiproportional reductions in costs openness was always preferable (and therefore
was also better for any situation in which innovation costs fell less rapidly relative to
imitation costs). Thus, contrary to the `conventional wisdom', openness need not always
result in a decline in innovation { in fact it might sometimes increase it. Furthermore,
as was illustrated by the use of an IS diagram, stronger results could be obtained if one
imposed more structure on the feasible set and/or the initial location of the innovation
under the closed regime.
On this last point, it is worth observing that producers of information goods may de-
rive some benet from their eorts, whether monetary or otherwise, that is not aected
by imitation of the original work. For example, they may be able to supply an associ-
ated complementary item { e.g. support services { which are not open to easy imitation
(perhaps they are rival or proprietary), or, alternatively, they may simply derive intrinsic
satisfaction from their creative endeavours.16
The existence of such an alternative, but related, source of `income', has three signicant
implications. First, and most obviously, it ensures a certain minimum level of `income'
even if openness has sharply reduced imitation costs and hence innovator's prots from the
16See e.g. Rossi (2004) for a review of these sorts of possibilities.INNOVATION, IMITATION AND OPEN SOURCE 17
original information good. Second, opening up the underlying information good is likely to
increase usage thereby stimulating demand for the complementary one. Third, and least
obvious, since knowledge of the original innovation is needed to supply the complementary
one, `open-sourcing', by increasing the gap between imitation and innovation costs, is likely
to increase an innovator's income on the complementary good by reducing the number of
competitors.
Crucially, all three of these eects act a) to increase the size of the feasible set, and b)
to increase it more at low levels of the imitation cost. In terms of the IS diagram this is an
increase in the feasible set in the lower left-hand quadrant. Cursory examination of the IS
diagram shows that it is precisely these sort of changes in the structure of the feasible set
which make openness (more) attractive (e.g. compare top and bottom diagrams in Figure
3). They therefore make it more likely that an open regime is superior to a closed one.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a simple framework with which to under the inter-
action of innovation and imitation. Using it we discussed how a move from a closed to
an open regime could be represented in `innovation space' as well as how to represent
(simultaneously) the set of feasible innovations { as determined by the underlying model
of competition between `innovators' and `imitators'.
It was shown that, when innovators enjoy rst-mover advantages, innovation may still
occur even when imitation is (substantially) cheaper than innovation. Going further we
proposed a basic condition, which if satised by underlying model of competition (as
encapsulated in the innovator's prot function), allowed us to derive important features
of the feasible set. With a regime determining the location of innovations in `innovation
space' one could use properties of the feasible set to make specic predictions about how
changes in regime aected the level of innovation.
Starting from the accumulating anecdotal and empirical evidence that openness may
confer signicant eciency advantages, we examined the situation where a move to open
production resulted in a reduction in both innovation costs as well as in imitation costs {
that is not simply a reduction in imitation costs alone as is usually assumed by the more
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Precise sucient conditions on the relative reductions in the two types of cost were
derived under which a move to an open regime would actually increase innovation. These
conditions had a particularly simple form: if the proportional reduction in innovation cost
was a least as large as that in imitation cost then an open regime was better. We discussed
the suciency aspect of this result and pointed out that in many situations it was likely
that much stronger results would hold. Here however, though we provided some explicit
examples to illustrate this point, we wished to remain at as general level as possible and
therefore did not go further in examining specic cases { this may be a fruitful area for
future work.
Nevertheless, we did observe that the ability of an innovator to sell some form of com-
plementary good would be one major example where stronger results could be obtained.
A cursory examination of current `real-world' practice reveals that this possibility is more
the norm that the exception. For example, the author of a piece of software is often able
to supply support services or additional `plugins'. Similarly a musician gives live perfor-
mances in addition to writing the music itself, and engineers may charge for consultancy
as well as access to any inventions they make.17
Thus, it is likely that in a variety of areas open approaches are a sustainable form of
operation and, at least in some cases, may be superior to proprietary ones. However, as
should be clear, we are not suggesting that this will always be the case. It is therefore
important for society to have some method for deciding for which industries, or technolo-
gies, it is so, and for which it is not. One of the primary contributions of this paper has
been precisely to provide a simple, intuitive, yet rich, framework in which, by reference to
an overarching `innovation space', one can go about doing this.
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